Action Categorization in Rhesus Monkeys: discrimination of grasping from non-grasping manual motor acts by Nelissen, Koen & Vanduffel, Wim
Action Categorization in Rhesus
Monkeys: discrimination of grasping
from non-grasping manual motor acts
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation Nelissen, Koen, and Wim Vanduffel. 2017. “Action Categorization
in Rhesus Monkeys: discrimination of grasping from non-grasping




Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAA
1Scientific REPORTS | 7: 15094  | DOI:10.1038/s41598-017-15378-6
www.nature.com/scientificreports
Action Categorization in Rhesus 
Monkeys: discrimination of 
grasping from non-grasping manual 
motor acts
Koen Nelissen1 & Wim Vanduffel1,2
The ability to recognize others’ actions is an important aspect of social behavior. While neurophysiological 
and behavioral research in monkeys has offered a better understanding of how the primate brain 
processes this type of information, further insight with respect to the neural correlates of action 
recognition requires tasks that allow recording of brain activity or perturbing brain regions while 
monkeys simultaneously make behavioral judgements about certain aspects of observed actions. Here 
we investigated whether rhesus monkeys could actively discriminate videos showing grasping or non-
grasping manual motor acts in a two-alternative categorization task. After monkeys became proficient in 
this task, we tested their ability to generalize to a number of untrained, novel videos depicting grasps or 
other manual motor acts. Monkeys generalized to a wide range of novel human or conspecific grasping 
and non-grasping motor acts. They failed, however, for videos showing unfamiliar actions such as a non-
biological effector performing a grasp, or a human hand touching an object with the back of the hand. This 
study shows the feasibility of training monkeys to perform active judgements about certain aspects of 
observed actions, instrumental for causal investigations into the neural correlates of action recognition.
The ability to recognize other individuals’ actions is of significant importance for primates and a fundamental 
aspect of social behavior. Rhesus monkeys’ ability to recognize, or even comprehend actions in terms of goals 
and intentions, is often assumed in many neurophysiological studies that use action observation as a proxy for 
action recognition or comprehension1–7. Since most of these studies did not include a behavioral response, it is 
difficult to quantify whether monkeys actually recognize these observed motor acts and to what degree neural 
activity during these observation tasks reflects action understanding. Several protocols have been used to study 
the monkey’s action comprehension abilities in a more ethological setting. These include experiments during 
which monkeys observed accidental versus intentional actions, rational versus irrational actions or actions per-
formed by actors in an unwilling versus an incapable situation. Monkey behavioral responses measured during 
these experiments include different paradigms such as looking-time, forced-choice food foraging, or observation 
of monkey’s vocal and body responses towards the actor8–13. Most of these behavioral studies, however, were per-
formed in a setting not easily compatible with simultaneous recording of brain activity.
While several action recognition models have been proposed (for recent review, see14) to date the exact mech-
anisms and detailed computations performed by the brain underlying action recognition, are far from under-
stood. To gain further insights into the neuronal correlates of action recognition, tasks will be required that allow 
measuring functional brain responses not only when subjects passively observe actions, but when they have to 
make behavioral judgements related to the observed actions15–18. Combining these behavioral tasks with revers-
ible perturbations19 will provide much needed causal evidence of specific visuo-motor nodes roles in action rec-
ognition. For instance, numerous studies using categorization tasks combined with focal reversible perturbations 
have allowed examining the causal role of certain brain regions in the perception of specific stimulus properties 
or categories in monkeys20–23. In humans on the other hand, in particular TMS in combination with behavioral 
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tasks has been employed to provide causal evidence for specific visuo-motor contributions to different aspects of 
action recognition24–26, for review see27.
In this behavioral study, we investigated rhesus monkeys’ ability to discriminate different types of motor acts. 
In a two-alternative forced-choice action categorization task, monkeys learned to discriminate grasping motor 
acts (Fig. 1a, Supplementary Video S1) from other manual non-grasping motor acts including touch with a finger 
(Fig. 1b, Supplementary Videos S2 and S5), touch with a closed fist (Supplementary Video S3), mimicked grasp 
next to an object (Supplementary Video S4). The monkeys indicated their choices by making a saccade to the left or 
right (Fig. 1a,b, right panels). After monkeys reached proficiency on this task (above 80% correct trials), we tested 
how well monkeys generalized this learned categorization rule (grasping versus non-grasping) to new, untrained 
videos of either grasping or non-grasping manual motor acts. During these generalization sessions, we tested if 
monkeys could discriminate untrained videos depicting 1) novel viewpoints of grasping and non-grasping motor 
acts, grasping with 2) novel objects and 3) novel effectors (human, conspecific or artificial), and non-grasping 
motor acts with 4) novel spatial positions of familiar hand configurations and 5) novel hand configurations.
Methods
Subjects. Two male (M1, M2) rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta, 4–6 kg, 3–5 years old) participated in the 
experiments. All animal care and experimental procedures met the national and European guidelines and were 
approved by the animal ethical committee of the KU Leuven.
General Fixation Training. The monkey subjects were accustomed to sitting in a sphinx position in a plas-
tic monkey chair, directly facing a liquid crystal display (LCD) screen (60 Hz frame rate), which was positioned 
at 57 cm from the monkeys‘ eyes28,29. During initial training, they were required to maintain fixation within a 
2° × 2° window centered on a red fixation target (size: 0.18° × 0.18°) in the middle of the screen. Eye position was 
monitored at 120 Hz through pupil position and corneal reflection (Iscan). During this initial training phase, the 
monkeys were rewarded (fruit juice) for fixating the small red target within the fixation window for long periods 
(up to several minutes).
Categorization task and training. The monkeys were trained to perform a two-alternative action cat-
egorization task, during which they had to discriminate videos of grasping motor acts from videos showing 
other manual non-grasping motor acts. Each categorization trial consisted of the following sequence of events: 
at the beginning of a trial, the monkey was required to fixate a small red fixation target (size: 0.18° × 0.18°) in 
the center of the screen, after which a video was presented with the fixation target superimposed (Fig. 1a,b, left 
panels). During video presentation, the monkey had to hold fixation within a 2° × 2° degree window centered on 
the fixation target. After presentation of the video, the central fixation target and the video were replaced by two 
peripheral white fixation targets (size: 0.18° × 0.18°), located along the horizontal meridian at 9.25° to the left or 
the right of the center of the screen. The monkey then had to make a saccade to one of the two targets in order to 
receive a juice reward (Fig. 1a,b, right panels). Grasping motor acts (Fig. 1a, Supplementary Video S1) were asso-
ciated with the left target and non-grasping motor acts (Fig. 1b, Supplementary Videos S2–5) with the right target. 
Trials would be aborted if the monkey did not hold his gaze within the 2° × 2° central window for the entire video 
presentation or if monkey failed to saccade to one of the two peripheral targets within 2 seconds after stimulus 
presentations. These aborts were not incorporated into the data analysis.
During the first training sessions, in some of the trials (up to 30% of the trials) only the correct peripheral 
target was presented after the video (Fig. 1c). This way monkeys learned the general procedure of initial fixation 
followed by a saccade to a peripheral target. Through association, monkeys learned the correct target location for 
the grasping versus the non-grasping videos. Initial training started with only 2 videos, depicting grasping of a 
baseball (Fig. 1a, left panel) or a finger touching the surface in front of the baseball (Fig. 1b, left panel). Gradually, 
during the following training sessions, more stimuli were added to the stimulus set, depicting grasping motor 
acts with the 18 different objects (6 examples shown in Fig. 2a) or non-grasping motor acts consisting of the 
finger touch front, finger touch side, fist touch or mimicked grasps (6 examples shown in Fig. 2b–e). During 
training sessions, stimuli were picked randomly from this stimulus set. During these first categorization ses-
sions, the rest of the trials consisted of two peripheral targets, and monkeys were rewarded for choosing the 
correct target. During later sessions, all trials consisted of two peripheral targets (Fig. 1d). In addition, we used a 
response-bias-correction procedure, similar to15. During this procedure, a trial in which an error occurred was 
followed by a trial of the same stimulus category. This procedure was maintained until the monkey made the cor-
rect response. Both monkeys typically performed around 600–700 trials during a daily training session.
Stimuli. A total of 90 videos (grasping and non-grasping) were used in the training session. Grasping videos 
consisted of a human hand grasping diverse objects (18 different objects in total) with various grips including 
precision grip, 3-finger grasp, and whole hand grasp. Figure 2a shows example frames of 6 of the objects that were 
used. The non-grasping motor acts consisted of the same human hand touching the surface next to the same 18 
objects used in the grasping videos. These non-grasping motor acts included touching the surface (table) with a 
finger (Fig. 2b,e), mimicking a grasp next to the object (Fig. 2c) or touching the surface next to the object with a 
closed fist (Fig. 2d). The grasping videos all started with a static, centrally-positioned object, followed by a human 
hand appearing in view and grasping the object, after which the hand released the object and disappeared out of 
view (Fig. 2f). A non-grasping video followed the same sequence of events: a video started with a static object, 
after which a hand came into view and touched the surface next to the object, and finally disappeared out of view 
(Fig. 2g, finger touch front). The videos measured 13.9 by 10.4 degrees, with a duration of 3 seconds.
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Figure 1. Two-alternative categorization task training and generalization testing procedure. Monkeys were 
required to fixate a video on a screen positioned in front of them showing either a grasping (a) or a non-
grasping (b) manual motor act. After video presentation, the video disappeared and two peripheral targets 
appeared on the screen. A liquid reward was given if monkeys made a saccade to the correct target (left for 
grasping, right for non-grasping motor acts). Monkey renderings in (a) and (b) were made using open-
source software Blender (https://www.blender.org/). (c) In the first training sessions, during a proportion of 
categorization trials (up to 30%) only the correct target was shown after video presentation (for illustration only 
a grasping trial is shown). A saccade to this target would be rewarded. The remainder of the trials consisted of 
two targets as shown in (d). The red dashed squares around the targets in A,B and C were not physically shown 
and are for illustration purpose only to indicate a saccade to that target would result in a reward. (d) During 
later training sessions, after video presentation, two targets were shown simultaneously and a reward was given 
for a saccade to the correct target. (e) During generalization testing, after video presentation, two targets would 
appear and selection of either target would be rewarded in order to avoid the monkey learning the novel stimuli.
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Generalization testing. After both monkeys had reached proficiency on the categorization task (consist-
ently above 80% correct trials), we tested their abilities to generalize the learned categorization rule to novel, 
untrained examples of grasping and non-grasping manual motor acts. In 13 different generalization sessions, we 
tested if monkeys could correctly categorize untrained videos with 1) novel viewpoints, 2) novel objects, 3) novel 
effectors (human, conspecific or artificial), 4) novel spatial positions of familiar hand configurations and 5) novel 
Figure 2. Visual stimuli used in the categorization task. (a) Six examples of different objects being grasped. 
(b–e) Six examples each of the different non-grasping motor acts: finger touch front (b), mimicked grasp (c), 
fist touch (d), finger touch side (e). (f) Frames of a grasping motor act: grasping videos showed a human hand 
approaching from the right and grasping a centrally-positioned object, after which the hand released the object 
and moved out of the frame. Monkeys were required to fixate the central small red spot superimposed on the 
video. (g) Frames of a non-grasping motor act: the non-grasping videos showed a human hand approaching 
from the right and touching the table without interacting with the object. In this example of a finger touch 
motor act, a finger touched the surface in front of the object, after which the hand moved out of sight.
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hand configurations. Six generalization tests involved novel, untrained examples of grasping motor acts, while in 
the 7 additional tests, behavioral responses were tested towards novel, untrained non-grasping motor acts. During 
these generalization tests, around 90% of the trials consisted of trained videos (familiar) which were rewarded 
only on the correct side. The other 10% of the trials consisted of the novel untrained videos and were rewarded on 
both sides (Fig. 1e), to avoid the monkey also learning these novel stimuli15,30. No bias correction was used dur-
ing these generalization sessions. During these generalization sessions, monkeys averaged 650 trials per session 
(which thus included ~65 trials with novel videos). For generalization tests 1 through 5, only one example of a 
novel motor act was used. For tests 6 through 13, the novel videos for that particular motor act consisted of the 18 
different objects on which the monkeys had been previously trained (see methods).
Results
Categorization learning. Figure 3 shows the training curves of both monkeys. Filled circles indicate ses-
sions during which a proportion of trials consisted of only a single target used to shape the animal’s response (see 
methods). Open circles indicate sessions during which all trials included both targets, in combination with a 
bias-correction (see methods). Initial training started with only two different videos (1 grasping, 1 non-grasping 
motor act) while in later phases more videos were gradually introduced. The arrows and corresponding numbers 
above the graphs (Fig. 3a,b) indicates the number of videos used during those time points in the course of the 
categorization training. While training in monkey M1 took several months (~90 sessions) before reaching a stable 
performance level using the 90 different videos (>80% accuracy), monkey M2 reached the same level of perfor-
mance much sooner (i.e. after ~50 sessions).
Generalization tests. Next, we investigated whether monkeys could generalize to untrained examples of 
grasping and non-grasping manual motor acts. These generalization tests allowed us to examine whether the 
monkeys had merely memorized the familiar videos seen during the extensive training and to ascertain how spe-
cific the acquired categorization performance was for certain aspects of the videos. The results of the generaliza-
tion tests are shown in Fig. 4. For generalization tests 1 through 5, only one novel video was used (frame shown in 
Fig. 4a). For tests 6 through 13, the novel videos for that particular motor act consisted of the 18 different objects 
on which the monkeys had been previously trained (see methods). As an illustration, a frame of one of these novel 
videos involving the baseball as the object is shown in Fig. 4a (6 to 13). Figure 4b shows the proportions of correct 
trials during these generalization tests for both monkeys. No bias correction was used during the entire generali-
zation tests. Black bars indicate the performance of each monkey for the familiar action videos (90% of the trials) 
during the generalization tests, which is an indication of how well the monkey performed the learned classifi-
cation task during that particular session. Colored bars indicate performance (proportion correct trials) for the 
10% trials during which novel, untrained videos (shown in Fig. 4a) were shown (monkey M1: red bars; monkey 
M2: yellow bars). Asterisks indicate significant generalization (binomial test, p < 0.05). For generalization tests 
1 through 6, in which a novel example of a grasping motor act was shown, significant generalization therefore 
indicates that monkeys categorized these novel videos correctly as ‘grasping’. For generalization tests 7 through 
13 in which a novel example of a non-grasping motor act was shown, significant generalization indicates that the 
monkeys categorized these novel videos correctly as ‘non-grasping’. As shown in Fig. 4b, monkeys generalized to 
untrained grasping motor acts depicting an object grasped with a precision grip (1) or whole hand grasp (2). Both 
monkeys could also generalize to a novel human actor performing a grasp (3) or to a conspecific grasping (4). 
However, both monkeys failed to generalize to grasping performed by an artificial prosthetic arm (5). Monkeys 
also generalized to a novel untrained viewpoint (mirror image of the trained viewpoint). This was the case for 
grasping motor acts (6) as well as for the non-grasping motor acts including a hand mimicking a grasp (7) or a fist 
touching the surface in front of the object (8).
Figure 3. Performance as function of training session. Categorization training results of monkey M1 (a) and 
M2 (b). Percent correct trials are shown for different daily training sessions. Filled circles indicate session 
during which a proportion of trials (up to 30%) consisted of single targets (Fig. 1c). The open circles indicate 
sessions in which all trials consisted of two targets (Fig. 1d). A bias correction was used during training sessions 
only (see methods). Black arrows indicate total number of different videos in the training stimulus set.
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During training, all non-grasping motor acts involved actions directed away from the object, depicting sit-
uations during which the human hand did not touch or interact with the object. Thus a possible strategy for the 
monkeys to solve the categorization task might have been to categorize the videos according to objects being 
Figure 4. Generalization results. (a) Frames of the novel videos used during the 13 different generalization test 
sessions. In 6 different sessions, novel untrained videos showing a grasping motor act were used. These included 
an object being grasped with a precision grip (1) or a whole-hand grasp (2), a male actor grasping a ball (3), a 
monkey grasping a small cylinder (4), a prosthetic arm grasping a ball (5) and finally, mirrored versions of the 
familiar grasping videos (6). In 7 additional generalization tests, we tested generalization to novel, untrained 
non-grasping motor acts. These included mirror versions of the familiar mimicked grasp (7) and fist touch (8) 
videos, a hand initiating a grasp which halted immediately prior touching the object (9), a finger touching the 
object (10), a fist touching the object (11), an open hand touching the object with the palm (12) and an open 
hand touching the object with the back of the hand (13). (b) Proportion correct trials during the generalization 
tests. Black bars indicate performance of the monkeys during the 13 generalization tests for the trained familiar 
videos (90% of trials). Red (monkey M1) and yellow (monkey M2) bars indicate performance from the 
monkeys on the novel, untrained videos (10% of trials). Asterisks indicate significant generalization (p < 0.05, 
binomial test). No bias correction was used during the generalization sessions.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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touched or interacted with. To investigate this possibility, we also tested the 3 familiar non-grasping motor acts 
(mimicked grasp, finger touch and fist touch) in a novel setting where these were directed towards the object. 
Videos of a hand initiating a grasp that stopped before making contact with the object were categorized correctly 
as a non-grasping motor act (9). While a finger touching an object was categorized correctly as a non-grasping 
motor act (10), both monkeys nonetheless failed to correctly categorize a closed fist touching an object and con-
sistently categorized this motor act as a grasp (11). Note that a novel viewpoint for motor acts depicting a closed 
fist whereby the object was not touched (8) was correctly categorized as a non-grasping action by both subjects. 
Finally, we tested videos depicting two novel hand configurations interacting with the object, during which an 
open hand either touched the object with the palm downwards (12) or upwards (13). Interestingly, both monkeys 
categorized the hand palm down videos correctly as a non-grasping motor act (12), but failed to categorize the 
hand palm-up motor act (13). Since performance was around chance level for the latter, neither monkey confused 
this action with a grasp, such as they apparently did for the closed fist touching the object (11). Rather, they pre-
sumably had problems attributing this non-familiar action to either of the 2 classes, as seemed to be the case for 
the artificial prosthetic arm in M2 (5).
Discussion
Action recognition is an important aspect of social cognition. Successful interaction in cooperative or competitive 
situations requires the ability to infer the goals and intentions of others,‘ actions. Especially since the discovery 
of mirror neurons2,31, there has been an increased interest in the neural substrates for action recognition, both in 
human and non-human primates.
Some of current theories as to how the brain processes information related to others’ actions14,32–34 are based to 
a large degree on single-cell evidence, describing selective neuronal responses during the observation of different 
actions and action settings. Although these studies have been instrumental in showing how different stimulus 
aspects and characteristics can influence neuronal responses, most have not directly tested action comprehension. 
Hence it remains difficult to conclude from such studies which aspects of the actions, such as the underlying goals 
and intentions of the actor or the efficacy of the action with respect the environmental constraints, a monkey 
comprehends when observing these actions.
Various behavioral protocols, also used in developmental and comparative research in human infants and 
apes, have been tested to investigate monkeys’ action comprehension abilities more directly with respect to 
understanding the goals and intentions of others’ actions. Some of these studies investigated monkeys’ behavioral 
responses while they observed rational versus irrational actions or accidental versus intentional actions8,10,12,35, 
while yet others assessed if monkeys can make a distinction between an actor that is unable versus one unwilling 
to perform a certain action9,13.
The main aim of our study was to use a two-alternative categorization task, compatible with simultaneous 
neurophysiological measurements, to examine if monkeys could discriminate different types of observed motor 
acts and were able to indicate in a straightforward manner their choice with a quantifiable behavioral response. 
Combining this type of operant behavioral experiments with current reversible perturbation techniques such as 
microstimulation, opto- and chemogenetics36–38, might provide additional insights into the crucial role of certain 
brain regions for action recognition and discrimination.
Our results show the feasibility of training monkeys to discriminate grasping motor acts from non-grasping 
types of manual motor acts, which are otherwise very similar. Although training took a substantial length of time 
(especially with monkey M1), both monkeys became very proficient in this task. Moreover, generalization tests 
suggest that monkeys did not merely memorize the videos or specific low-level details of the stimuli to solve the task, 
but could transfer the learned categorization rule to a wide range of novel untrained videos. Monkey M2, as opposed 
to monkey M1, had prior experience with performing a visually-guided saccade task39 before learning the action 
categorization task, which might partly explain the faster learning curve of monkey M2. However, both monkeys 
reached overall similar levels in performance after around 10 sessions when only a few stimuli were introduced to 
the stimulus batch, indicating monkey M1 did not have an overall problem learning the saccade task. While the 
lengthy training in our study was partly due to the setup of the experiment (introducing a large number of different 
stimuli to the stimuli batch over a longer period of time) and our rather strict threshold of expected performance on 
the task (above 80%), similar behavioral studies show that overall task performance on these tasks are both related 
to task difficulty and individual differences between subjects. For instance, Vangeneugden et al.15 trained monkeys 
on a similar task requiring their monkeys to discriminate actions depicting humanoid walkers. While the 3 monkey 
subjects in that study reached over 90% correct performance in as little as 10 training sessions when discrimination 
leftward versus rightward walking, individual differences in training length and overall performance became much 
more pronounced when monkeys had to discriminate forward versus backward walkers. While one of the subjects 
in that study reached near perfect performance on this task after 40 training sessions, their monkey M2 for instance 
never reached above 80% correct performance, even after 60 sessions.
Our behavioral study resulted in several interesting findings. Our data suggest that our monkeys did not 
interpret novel videos showing a mechanical grasping effector (prosthetic hand) in a manner similar to novel 
human or conspecific effectors performing the same grasp. While our experiment was not designed to test goal 
understanding per se, our finding seems in line with ethological observations made in rhesus monkeys and 
developmental studies in infants. Wood et al.35 used a two-option social foraging context and examined whether 
macaques would comprehend tool-related (non-biological) actions as goal-directed. While monkeys were able to 
interpret human actions that belonged to their own motor repertoire as goal-directed, they failed to do so when 
observing actions done with a pole or machete. Likewise, developmental studies suggest that 6-month-old infants 
respond differently to grasping actions performed by a human or an artificial effector, suggesting that infants 
considered only human actions as goal-directed at that early age40.
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Although monkeys failed to generalize to an artificial grasp, one cannot conclude that monkeys fail to acquire 
a concept of the functionality of artificial effectors or tools, but prior observational41 or motor training42 seems 
to be a requirement for achieving such generalization. Previously, we have shown that rhesus monkeys can learn 
about the functionality of tools and are able to acquire the highly skilled motor control necessary to operate these 
devices43. Our supplementary footage (Supplementary Video S6) shows that monkeys not only can use pliers to 
retrieve food in a controlled way, but they also understand the functionality of certain tool features, as evidenced 
by their ability to correctly rotate the tool to retrieve the food in an efficient manner. Future experiments will be 
needed to investigate the degree to which actions done with tools or non-biological effectors generalize to novel 
untrained non-biological actions, after monkeys have acquired experience, either through association learning 
(as in our categorization task) or through physical motor experience with these tools43,44.
While our experiment required monkeys to discriminate ‘grasping’ from ‘non-grasping’ videos, it is diffi-
cult to assess with certainty what visual aspects of the videos the monkeys used to solve the categorization task. 
Our generalization data suggest that monkeys did not solve the task by merely memorizing, nor by discriminat-
ing between motor acts that involve an effector interacting with an object versus effector movements that were 
directed away from the object. A finger or an open hand palm touching an object were correctly categorized as 
non-grasping, while a non-biological effector (prosthetic arm) interacting with an object failed to be categorized 
correctly. The fact that a closed fist touching an object was consistently discriminated as a grasp in both animals, 
suggests that particular combinations of local features, for example a thumb and additional fingers in close prox-
imity to the object may have been a particularly informative cue with which to solve the categorization task.
Since monkeys were required to fixate the entire duration of the videos before making a saccade to a target, we 
cannot know during which phase of the observed actions monkeys made their decision. In order to investigate 
this, the task could be altered by showing the 2 peripheral targets together with the action video and by allowing 
the monkey to make a choice at any stage of the video presentation. Our current task also required monkeys to 
make a saccade to the same target location for a specific action class. In order to avoid a motor bias, which doesn’t 
affect the current behavioral data but which could be detrimental during electrophysiology or functional imag-
ing experiments, the task could be altered by associating each action class with a target cue differing in shape or 
color. After video presentation, these targets could then be displayed randomly in a balanced fashion at different 
locations. As an alternative, instead of using saccades as a behavioral response measurement, monkeys could also 
be trained to use their hands to indicate their decision, either pressing down on a button or lifting their hand39. 
When combining this categorization task with a measurement of functional brain activity to gain insights in the 
neural correlates of action recognition, baseline trials could be added during which monkeys fixate only a central 
fixation point and afterwards make their motor response (saccade or hand movement) to select either of the 2 
peripheral targets to receive their reward. In addition, in order to understand the specificity of potential causal 
effects of focal perturbations during these type of action discrimination tasks, it will be useful also to contrast 
these type of tasks with similar categorization tasks requiring judgements on non-action stimuli, or action versus 
non-action stimuli. Finally, we should mention that we only tested a limited number of generalization settings. 
Related to recent observations in humans18,45, it may be interesting to investigate in future experiments if discrim-
ination of observed actions in monkeys is either dependent or independent of viewpoint.
Unfamiliarity with the observed motor acts seems to be an important factor for failure to generalize to novel 
action displays in our experiment. Both monkeys had problems interpreting the prosthetic arm grasping and the 
inverted hand touching an object. While it is difficult to disentangle whether this unfamiliarity primarily reflects 
perceptual or motor unfamiliarity (in the case of the inverted hand), a behavioral study that investigated mon-
keys’ ability to evaluate the effectiveness of goal-directed motor acts10 showed that monkeys detect the efficacy of 
the goals of observed motor acts, provided they belong to the observer’s motor repertoire. In this study, monkeys’ 
capacity for understanding the efficacy of goal-directed and familiar motor acts failed to generalize to unfamiliar 
motor acts. On the other hand, other behavioral research in free-ranging rhesus monkeys suggests when assess-
ing action outcomes, monkeys do not need to have exact motor representations of these actions46. With respect 
to visual familiarity, it is of interest that infant research shows that while 9-month-old infants do not interpret 
actions with a mechanical claw as goal-directed, perceptual exposure to a human operating that device, allowed 
9-month old infants to interpret these actions as goal-directed47.
Our inverted-hand motor act that appeared in the generalization test (13) resembles a condition used in sev-
eral behavioral studies investigating monkeys’ ability to differentiate intentional from accidental actions8,12,35. For 
instance, Wood and co-authors8,35 used a visually similar action (hand flop) and reported that monkeys (tama-
rins and rhesus monkeys) as well as apes (chimpanzees), selected containers potentially containing food more 
often when a human experimenter would touch it with an intentional motor act (hand grasp), as compared to 
an accidental condition, in which the human experimenter dropped his hand in a reversed manner (palm facing 
upwards) onto the container. The authors suggest that because this motor act is not part of the monkeys natural 
motor repertoire, this may have led to an inability to comprehend this gesture as a goal-directed action35. Although 
they would be physically capable of producing this type of motor behavior, they presumably have no actual motor 
experience with it. Using similar actions, including an inverted-hand flop as Wood and co-authors35, Costes-Thiré 
and co-workers12, on the other hand, failed to find evidence for discrimination between accidental and intentional 
actions in Tonkean macaques and capuchin monkeys. While investigating intention recognition was beyond the 
scope of our current experiments, similar categorization tests such as the one described here might be informative 
for investigating whether monkeys can indeed discriminate accidental from intentional actions.
Conclusions
Our study shows the feasibility of training monkeys on an active action observation task in which monkeys 
not only had to observe actions, but had to discriminate the observed motor acts and indicate their choices 
with a straightforward behavioral measure. Generalization testing showed a high degree of transfer to untrained 
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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novel action videos. These types of tasks, in combination with neurophysiological recordings and reversible per-
turbations, will be instrumental in gaining a more in-depth understanding of the neural correlates of action 
recognition.
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